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ABSTRACT
The idea that market and non-market processes function in ways that exac-
erbate initial differences in human capital and wealth, has been at the centre
of economic theory for decades. Though there are a number of channels
through which such intergenerational transmission of poverty and inequal-
ity may occur, economists have noted the importance of imperfect credit
markets, fiscal policies, threshold externalities, mortality differentials and in-
stitutions. This thesis highlights some of these processes and concentrates on
the theories of multiple equilibria. The thesis is divided into three parts. The
first chapter deals with the relationship between human capital, child labour
and mortality and shows how multiple equilibria may emerge. The second
paper analyses the role of foreign aid in overcoming child labour traps. The
final chapter analyses the role of political and economic institutions in FDI
policies.
Chapter 1 identifies situations in which child labour is a temporary phe-
nomena and situations in which it is not. The paper utilizes a three period
OLG model with endogenous life expectancy and child labour, with both,
private and public education systems. It is shown that under certain assump-
tions the evolution of child labour exhibits an “inverted-U” shaped pattern,
suggesting that the problem of child labour is a temporary stage of economic
development. In this case human capital inequalities are temporary. But the
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results also show that under reasonable assumptions child labour may show
long run persistence and human capital distribution may exhibit polarization.
The novel feature of the paper is that it shows how the interaction between
human capital and life expectancy is crucial to child labour dynamics and
can create multiple equilibria.
Chapter 2 studies a model where multiple equilibria emerge in a model
where mortality is exogenous but fertility and child labour decisions are en-
dogenous. In a three period overlapping generations model with child labour,
exogenous increases in child health endowments increase child labour and fer-
tility. On the other hand, cash transfer and compulsory education funded
through foreign aid have a negative effect on child labour. Foreign aid has
a positive effects on fertility if cash transfers for child support are uncondi-
tional, and no effect if transfers are conditional on time spent in school. This
result supports conditional cash transfer programs like the Brazilian Bolsa
Familia.
The first two chapters show how variations in the initial levels of human
capital lead to widely divergent long run outcomes. In the third chapter
attention is shifted to a different type of initial condition, namely political
and economic institutions. Both Brazil and India are important emerging
economies and despite many similarities their approach towards foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) has been markedly different. This chapter analyses
the reasons behind this from a historical perspective. Following previous
literature it is argued that historical experiences of the two nations exerted
a lasting influence on economic policies followed by the two economies. In
nineteenth century Brazil, initial industrial growth was closely related to in-
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ternational trade and international finance. Further, for a number of reasons,
entrepreneurs and policy makers were more open to foreign investments. In
contrast, in India, colonization led to a negative perception with regards to
foreign investment and as a result FDI played a limited role in the economy
until the 1990’s. Even in the neo-liberal era, though both economies have
opened their economies to FDI, India continues to restrict its role and has
followed a more gradualist approach.
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CHAPTER 1
CHILD LABOUR, HUMAN CAPITAL
ACCUMULATION AND MORTALITY
1.1 Introduction
It has been estimated that there are over 200 million child labourers across
the world of which 115 million children are employed in hazardous indus-
tries. The idea of children working in sweatshops and in chemical industries
is obviously ethically and morally abhorrent. Moreover, child employment
can have deleterious effects on the economy as well. By displacing schooling,
child employment can reduce human capital accumulation. On the other
hand, it has been argued that children work because families are poor (Basu
and Van 1998). In the absence of alternative sources of income, when capital
markets are imperfect, child labour can potentially be the difference between
survival and destitution. In such situations child employment provides fami-
lies with additional income that may help them cope with poverty and even
encourage investments in child quality (Dessy and Pallage 2004; Patrinos and
Psacharopoulos 1997). Seen in this light policy makers are faced with a ma-
jor trade off. On the one hand child labour may be harmful and absolutely
immoral, but on the other hand it could just be an inevitable stage of the
development process that societies have to bear with, at least in the short run.
Historians of child labour have noted how the industrial revolution in Eu-
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rope was associated with massive increases in child labour. But eventually as
the fruits of development trickled down to the average household and as fam-
ily wages increased, the employment of children began to decline (Nardinelli
1980). Britain, which had some of the highest incidence of child labour in
Europe, saw a sustained decline in child labour after 1870. Based on the
historical record of advanced economies it may be tempting to think about
child labour in contemporary developing economies as a temporary distor-
tion, something that would be wiped out in the long run. A similar logic has
been used by Krugman (1997) to make a case for allowing sweatshops in de-
veloping economies. In his view, though sweatshops are exploitative, they are
temporary maladies associated with initial stages of economic development.
Sweatshops are necessary evils that allow families to cope with poverty and
any attempts at banning them may actually aggravate the problems faced
by developing nations.
The powerful logic of these views cannot be ignored and policy makers
have to contend with these trade offs in a careful manner. But it should
also be noted that these opinions are based on an implicit assumption that
economic modernization is inevitable, a view that was tremendously popu-
lar amongst development economists in the 1950’s and 1960’s. To Rostow
(1990) the process of economic development was best understood as a se-
quence of “stages”. He believed that in the incipient stages, economies start
out as traditional societies and in this stage they face a variety of economic
bottlenecks. But he also believed that the process of growth and develop-
ment would eventually propel these traditional economies towards a phase of
self-sustained growth and the distortions associated with traditional societies
would disappear. Based on the experiences of developed economies, Kuznet
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(1955) noted that a characteristic feature of modern economic growth was an
“inverted-U” shaped pattern of inequality, in which temporary increases of
inequality would be followed by greater equality in advanced stages of devel-
opment. Similarly Keynes, though an ardent critic of markets, believed that
with appropriate state intervention economic progress was inevitable. Writ-
ing in the early stages of the Great Depression, in an essay titled “Economic
Possibility for our Grandchildren”, he says:
“All this means in the long run that mankind is solving its economic
problem. I would predict that the standard of life in progressive countries
one hundred years hence will be between four and eight times as high as it
is to-day. There would be nothing surprising in this even in the light of our
present knowledge. It would not be foolish to contemplate the possibility of
afar greater progress still”(Keynes [1930]1932: 364-365).
In this paper we throw light on some of these complex questions. We
attempt to identify situations in which child labour is a temporary phenom-
ena and situations in which it is not. More specifically, we show that under
certain assumptions the evolution of child labour exhibits an “inverted-U”
shaped pattern, strongly supporting Krugman’s hypothesis that distortions
like sweatshops and child labour are indeed temporary fallouts of economic
development. But the results also show that under reasonable assumptions
child labour may show long run persistence. To study these questions we
construct a three period OLG model with endogenous mortality and child
labour, with both, private and public education systems. In order to capture
the trade off between child labour and human capital, we assume that the
human capital of each agent consists of schooling and non-schooling inputs
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(Fan 2004; Contreras 2008). This allows for child labour to have two con-
tradictory effects on human capital: on the one hand it displaces schooling
and reduces human capital, but on the other hand the additional income
generated encourages investments in the non-schooling input.
In the first section of the paper, we study the evolution of human capital
in an economy with homogeneous agents. In this case we find that optimal
child labour and schooling are independent of parental human capital i.e.
child labour is a persistent phenomenon even in the long run. In the absence
of any endogenous mechanism to reduce child labour external interventions
and regulations are the only way of ensuring that child labour declines. How-
ever, the impact of these regulations on human capital could be detrimental
to the economy. In a publicly financed education system, child labour regula-
tions improve human capital accumulation. However in a privately financed
system the results change drastically and we find that child labour regula-
tions may reduce human capital accumulation. From a policy perspective
this indicates that unless anti-child labour policies are supported by public
investments in education, economic development may be retarded.
In the second part of the paper we study the evolution of human capi-
tal in a model with heterogeneous agents. Agents differ from each other in
terms of the initial human capital endowment. We introduce non-convexities
in the mortality function to show how small initial differences can be am-
plified into polarization of the long run human capital distribution1. Thus
1The non-convexity in the mortality function takes the form of a human capital thresh-
old. Above a particular threshold parents are “sufficiently” healthy and allocate fewer
resources towards their own health. But below the threshold parents are likely to spend a
larger portion of their incomes on their own survival.
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like in Chakraborti and Das (2005a, 2005b), mortality differentials can play
an important role in perpetuating inequality. Here again the type of edu-
cational system plays a big role in determining the long run distribution of
human capital. In a private education regime, inequalities can be persistent.
In a public education system global externalities generated by public inputs
form a link between various dynasties, so that human capital accumulation
of richer households have a “trickle down” effect on poorer households (Ga-
lor and Tsiddon 1996, 1997). Thus inequalities could decrease in a public
education system. As far as child labour dynamics are concerned there are
two possible outcomes. Child labour could either exhibit an “inverted-U”
shaped pattern or exhibit long run persistence.
There are three main contributions of this paper. First, this paper con-
tributes to existing literature on inequality. Previous studies have shown
how credit markets (Banerjee and Newman 1993; Galor and Zeira 1993), fis-
cal policies (Alesina and Rodrik 1994) or institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001;
Engerman and Sokoloff 2002) generate inequality. There is a growing lit-
erature which suggest that mortality differentials are an additional channel
through which inequalities can be transmitted from one generation to the
next (Castello´-Climent and Dome´nech 2008; Chakrabarti and Das 2005b).
These studies however do not incorporate child labour dynamics into their
analysis. Second, this paper shows conditions under which an “inverted-U”
shaped pattern for child labour may emerge by isolating the impact of life
expectancy on labour market decisions. Bar and Basu (2009) investigate a
similar hypothesis for child labour but provide a different channel. In their
study child labour may initially increase with landed wealth, but eventually
intergenerational bequests rise sufficiently and put the economy on a low
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child labour trajectory. Thirdly, the paper underscores the importance of
public infrastructural spending in eradicating child labour. In this way it
adds to existing literature on the relation between public spending and de-
velopment (Tamura 1991; Glomm and Ravikumar 1992, 2003; De la Croix
and Doepke 2004; Bhattacharya and Qiao 2007, Fioroni 2010 ).
1.2 The Model
Consider an OLG model with three periods: childhood, parenthood and old-
age. In the first period agents are children. A child can either work (lt) or go
to school (st). The cost of sending a child to school is, thus, the opportunity
cost of forgone child labour income. All such decisions are taken by the
parent. We assume child labour is γ times as productive as adult labour
(Basu and Van 1998). Thus when adult wages are wt then children earn γwt.
In the second period, the agents reach parenthood. Though all agents survive
to adulthood with certainty, the survival to old age is uncertain. Adult agents
must therefore decide on how much to spend on their own survival xt (given
an endogenous probability of survival θ(xt)). In addition they must also
decide on human capital investments of their children, which include child
labour and schooling decisions. In old-age, agents derive utility from human
capital of their children (ht+1). Following Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) we
suppose that an adult agent faces the following objective function:
θ(xt)
ht+1
1−σ
1− σ where σ, θ(.) ∈ (0, 1) (1.1)
We assume human capital accumulation depends on three inputs: (i) the
amount of schooling each agent receives as a child (st), (ii) non-schooling or
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quality expenditures that agents receive as children,( quality expenditures
may include things like provision of nutritious food, vaccinations, vitamin
supplementation, adequate child health care or improving quality of educa-
tion by opting for private tutors, for example.) and (iii) Parental human
capital. Within this set up, quality expenditures may be financed privately
or publicly. In a public education regime the government imposes a flat
rate tax τ to fund public expenditures. We assume the government balances
budgets. The human capital production function can be written as:
ht+1 = (E
η
t e
1−η
t )
α(st)
β(ht)
1−α−β where α + β < 1; α, β ∈ (0, 1) (1.2)
Here Et is the public input and et is the privately financed quality expen-
diture. To isolate the impact of public and private education systems we
consider two cases. In one scenario η = 1 i.e. child quality expenditures
are entirely financed by the government and there is no scope for private
investment (a public education system). In the second case η = 0, so that
all quality expenditures are privately financed (a private education system).
This production function is similar to the model in Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992), Fan (2004) and Contreras (2008).
1.2.1 The Public Education System: η = 1
Consider the first scenario in which government taxes adult agents at a rate
τ . In this case Et = τwtht The production of human capital is given by:
ht+1 = (Et)
α(st)
βht
1−α−β (1.3)
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In this case, the optimization problem is:
maximize
xt,st
θ(xt)
ht+1
1−σ
1− σ
s.t.
xt = wtht(1− τ) + wthtγ(1− st) (1.4)
ht+1 = (Et)
α(st)
β(ht)
1−α−β (1.5)
st + lt = 1, γ > 0 (1.6)
The budget constraint ((1.4)) indicates parent’s spending on their own sur-
vival which is financed by their own incomes net of taxes and income gen-
erated from child labour. Note that children are γ times as productive as
adults. Thus child labour and adult labour are substitutable (Basu and Van
1998). The human capital function is given by (1.5). (1.6) denote standard
constraints. In order to ensure a solution exists we suppose that the elasticity
of survival function θ with respect to health expenditure (which we denote by
), is less than σ (Lemma 1, Bhattacharya and Qiao 2007). From the above
equations and the optimization problem we obtain the following FOC’s:
st : −θ′(xt)wthtγht+1
1−σ
1− σ + θ(xt)βEt
αst
β−1ht
1−α−βht+1
−σ = 0 (1.7)
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Using the FOC, together with the budget constraint and the elasticity equa-
tion  = θ
′(xt)xt
θ(xt)
we obtain the following optimal solutions:
xt =
wtht(1 + γ − τ)
+ β(1− σ) (1.8)
st =
(1 + γ − τ)(1− σ)β
γ(+ β(1− σ)) (1.9)
Substituting the above optimal solutions into the human capital equation,
we get:
ht+1 = ∆
1(ht)
1−β ,where ∆1 = (τwt)α(
β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1− τ + γ)
(+ β(1− σ))
)β
(1.10)
For a range of parametric values ∆1(ht)
1−β is concave. A trivial and non-
trivial steady state (hPU) exist. Moreover since child labour (1−st) is simply
a function of parameters, it persists even in the long run. This implies that
there is no endogenous mechanism that alleviates the child labour problem
and that external interventions like bans and sanctions may be required.
Following Fan (2004) we measure the impact of anti-child labour regulations
by γ. The intuition is that regulations that penalize the use of child labour
end up reducing relative productivity γ. From our derivation above we can
see that as γ decreases, parents find it increasingly attractive to send children
to school rather than to work. This suggests that government regulations
against child labour (by decreasing γ) are likely to decrease child labour and
augment human capital. This result is formally stated below.
Proposition 1 The degree of substitutability between adult and child labour,
γ, is inversely related to schooling st and the steady state human capital h
PU
i.e. dh
PU
dγ
≤ 0 and dst
dγ
≤ 0
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Proof: Follows from the solutions found above.
There has been substantial discussion regarding the impact of harsh anti-
child labour regulations, and our results suggest that these interventions can
improve human capital. But as we shall see below, this result is sensitive to
the type of educational regime being analysed.
1.2.2 The Private Education System: η = 0
Now let us analyse the second possible scenario in which child quality expen-
ditures are entirely privately financed. This implies that the human capital
production function is:
ht+1 = (et)
α(st)
βht
1−α−β (1.11)
The optimization problem is similar to the previous case except that now
there is no state involvement. The modified problem can be restated as:
maximize
xt,et,st
θ(xt)
ht+1
1−σ
1− σ
s.t.
xt + et = wtht + wthtγ(1− st) (1.12)
ht+1 = (et)
α(st)
β(ht)
1−α−β (1.13)
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0 ≤ et ≤ 1, st + lt = 1, γ > 0 (1.14)
Notice that the budget constraint indicates that a parent’s spending on their
own survival and on the quality of their child is financed by adult and child
labour incomes. The FOC’s give us:
et : −θ′(xt)ht+1
1−σ
1− σ + θ(xt)αet
α−1stβht
1−α−βht+1
−σ = 0 (1.15)
st : −θ′(xt)wthtγht+1
1−σ
1− σ + θ(xt)βet
αst
β−1ht
1−α−βht+1
−σ = 0 (1.16)
Using the budget constraint, the FOC’s and the equation for elasticity of the
survival function  = θ
′(xt)xt
θxt
we obtain the following optimal solutions:
xt =
(1 + γ)wtht
+ (α + β)(1− σ) (1.17)
st =
(1 + γ)(1− σ)β
γ(+ (α + β)(1− σ)) (1.18)
et =
(1 + γ)wtht(1− σ)α
+ (α + β)(1− σ) (1.19)
Like the previous case, optimal schooling is independent of parental human
capital ht. Moreover, while schooling is negatively related to the degree of
adult labour-child labour substitution (γ), both et and xt are positively asso-
ciated with it. We may conclude that child labour income is complementary
to child-quality expenditures and adult health expenditures. The human
capital accumulation law can be re-written as:
ht+1 = ∆
2(ht)
1−β where ∆2 = (wtα)α(
β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1 + γ)
+ (α + β)(1− σ)
)α+β
(1.20)
For plausible parameters, the function ∆2(ht)
1−β is concave and there is
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one non-trivial steady state solution for the above dynamic system (hPV ).
An important difference between the private and public education systems
is the relationship between γ and the steady state human capital. In a
private education model a child’s participation in the labour market though
detrimental to schooling, can be counterbalanced by an increase in child
quality spending, as long as γ is big enough. In other words, the extra
resources generated by child labour income ensures that a child’s labour
force participation is complementary to human capital growth (for a high
enough value of γ). This result is formalized in the next proposition:
Proposition 2 The relation between γ and the child schooling (st) and steady
state human capital (hPV ) can be summarized as:
dhPV
dγ
T 0⇔ γ T β
α
and
dst
dγ
≤ 0 (1.21)
Proof: Follows from the solutions found above.
In LDC’s where the labour market is restricted to low skilled occupations
(textiles, gems and jewellery, agriculture etc.) one may expect relative child
productivity, γ, to be high. In such cases, government regulations against
child labour, partial bans and sanctions, would hurt the economy. To put
it differently anti-child labour policies would improve human capital only if
they are backed by a public education system. In the absence of such a public
funded system, reductions in γ may diminish human capital.
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1.3 Discussion
In development economics there is a substantial literature on the relation
between child endowments and human capital (Becker and Tomes 1976;
Behrman Pollak and Taubman 1982). It has been argued that child en-
dowments (skills, abilities etc.) are important determinants of parental in-
vestments in child quality. In general, a parent may follow three types of
investment strategies: compensating (If parents invest more in those chil-
dren who have smaller endowments), reinforcing (If parents invest more in
those children who have larger endowments) and neutral (If a parent’s invest-
ment is equal across children irrespective of their endowments)2. Obviously
the type of strategy pursued has a crucial impact on the child’s future human
capital.
In a model with private expenditures, we find that parents follow a com-
pensating investment policy for plausible values of γ. Children with better
labour productivity (lower schooling ability) receive lesser schooling. But the
resulting child labour income allows parents to compensate this by spending
on child quality. Another way of understanding this result is to look at the
FOC’s in (1.15) and (1.16). An increase in child labour income allows parents
to spend more on their own health, thereby increasing their probability of sur-
vival to old-age. By increasing the patience parameter (and hence decreasing
the marginal utility from an additional unit of health expenditure), parents
are more willing to spend on their child’s future human capital. In contrast,
under a publicly financed system parents follow a re-enforcing strategy of
investment. Children with better productivity (lower schooling ability) are
2See Behrman Pollak and Taubman 1982 for a discussion.
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forced to devote a larger share of their time allocation towards work (1− st).
But unlike the previous case this does not bring about any compensating
increase in child quality expenditures. A combination of these two forces
results in lower human capital for children with higher labour productivity
(lower schooling ability).
It is clear from the model that there are differences in how a child is
valued in the economy. That these differentials may depend on, amongst
other things, cultural and social perceptions should also be stressed. To
take an example, it has been argued that women in many Asian and African
countries suffer from lower standards of living than men. Amartya Sen had
famously argued that this general neglect of women in Asia and Africa meant
that “more than 100 million women were missing” due to excess mortality.
The results obtained above provide one channel through which this gender
differential arises. In LDC’s social and cultural norms imply a particular
division of labour in which women are generally involved in unpaid home
production, while males are generally employed in “productive”, wage earn-
ing occupations like farming etc. These differences in productivity (or at
least what is perceived as being productive), could very well result in lower
human capital for women if, for instance, parents compensate more “produc-
tive” male children with better quality expenditures than female children.
What is important to understand is that these differences are not just a re-
sult of differences in natural endowments but also a result of complex social
and cultural norms including traditional male-female divisions of labour. In
an empirical study, Barcellos et al. (2012) find evidence that parents tend
to invest more on male children than on female children. Thus not only do
male children receive greater child care they also receive better vitamin sup-
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plementation, vaccinations etc.
To illustrate our point let us develop a simple extension of our models
presented above, for an economy with heterogeneous agents. Following Car-
dak (1999), we assume that the heterogeneity in this model could stem from
two sources: (a) from differences in the initial human capital distribution
and (b) because children differ from each other in terms of the parameter
γ. Assume the γ is independent of the initial distribution of human capi-
tal3. For the sake of brevity we shall analyse a private education model4. To
simplify our analysis let us suppose that there are two types of households
(N = 2): those with initial endowment (γH , hH,0) and those with (γ
L, hL,0),
where γH > γL. As before, in a private education regime each parent need
to decide on child schooling (sit), child quality investments (eit) and their
own health expenditures (xit). From the results obtained earlier, the optimal
human capital accumulation for type i under a private education regime is:
hi,t+1 = (wtα)
α(
β
γi
)β
(
(1− σ)(1 + γi)
+ (α + β)(1− σ)
)α+β
(hi,t)
1−β (1.22)
In order to understand the determinants of inequality let us define gt =
h¯t+1
h¯t
and define per capita human capital as h¯t =
(hH,t+hL,t)
2
. Following Fioroni
(2010) we can define relative human capital as:
hˆi,t =
hi,t
ht
(1.23)
But this implies hˆL,t+1 = 2− hˆH,t+1. The relative human capital for high and
3Thus both pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors influence the dynamics of inequality.
4The same procedure can be applied in an identical fashion to a public education system
15
low types can be written as:
hˆH,t+1 =
hH,t+1
ht+1
=
1
gtht
β
(wtα)
α(
β
γH
)β
(
(1− σ)(1 + γH)
(+ (α + β)(1− σ))
)α+β
(hˆH,t)
1−β
(1.24)
hˆL,t+1 = 2− hˆH,t+1 = 1
gtht
β
(wtα)
α(
β
γL
)β
(
(1− σ)β(1 + γL)
(+ (α + β)(1− σ))
)β
(hˆL,t)
1−β
(1.25)
Taking the ratio of the above equations we get:
hˆH,t+1
2− hˆH,t+1
=
 (1+γH)α+β(γH)β
(1+γL)α+β
(γL)β
( hˆH,t
2− hˆH,t
)1−β
(1.26)
The distributions of human capital for the two types diverge and inequality
is persistent as long as γH 6= γL. To see this, suppose that γH = γL. Under
this assumption, the dynamic system (1.26), reduces to:
hˆH,t+1 =
2
[ 2
hˆH,t
− 1]1−α−β + 1 (1.27)
We provide a basic sketch the dynamics of this system, though an interested
reader may refer to Fioroni (2010) for a detailed proof. Clearly (1.27) has
two steady states at 0 and 1 where the steady state at 1 is stable. But at
the higher steady state of 1, since hˆH,t+1 = 2 − hˆL,t+1, the human capital
of low-type and high type households converge to the same point. In other
words, when λi = λ for all i, then the long run distribution of human capital
becomes degenerate and inequality disappears:
lim
t→+∞
hi,t+1(hi,t, λ) = h
PV ∀i, i = 1, 2, ...N
The examples above, though extremely simple, point to the multi-dimensional
nature of the child labour problem: inequalities emerge even if the two house-
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holds begin at the same initial wealth level, w0h0. Here the divergence is
entirely generated by non-pecuniary factors. This obviously has important
implications for targeting vulnerable households since purely monetary mea-
sures might turn out to be poor indicators of vulnerability. In that sense, the
inter-relationship between wealth and non-wealth factors is absolutely crucial
in understanding and framing policies aimed at regulating child labour and
improving human capital of a nation5. One possible policy that could reduce
inequality would be a cash transfer program. If households with vulnerable
children could be targeted, in the long run one could expect inequalities to
disappear.
1.4 Human Capital Inequality and Externalities
The process of economic development generates uneven processes that aggra-
vate inequality but can also produce counteracting compensatory forces that
ameliorate inequalities. Under conditions of perfect competition traditional
growth models predict convergence in the long run. However, in the past few
decades economists have begun to study conditions under which long run
distributions exhibit polarization. It is argued that when capital markets
are imperfect and markets exhibit threshold effects, initial levels of wealth
dictate long run outcomes. When access to credit is limited, agents who
find themselves below a particular threshold could be stuck in poverty traps,
while others may escape this fate. In this section we shall briefly study an
economy with heterogeneous agent and analyse the dynamics of inequalities
in the presence of threshold effects in the mortality function. Following Galor
and Tsiddon (1996, 1997) we show that a combination of neighbourhood ef-
5See Fors (2012) for a discussion and survey
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fects, thresholds and non-existent credit markets generate inequalities which
can be persistent.
Consider an economy with individuals defined by a measure N. Denote the
initial distribution of human capital by G0(hi0). Following Bhattacharya and
Qiao (2007), we assume that the probability of survival for agent i depends
on a private input xit and an externality ψ(.) which is a function of human
capital. More specifically, the survival probability is:
θ(xit, hit) =

bψ¯xit
bψ¯ if hit ≥ h˜
bψ(hit)xit
bψ(hit) if hit < h˜
(1.28)
Here b is a constant while ψ(hit) is an externality arising from the local home
environment. This implies that the elasticity of health expenditures can be
written as:
 =
xitθ
′
θ
=

bψ¯ if hit ≥ h˜
bψ(hit) if hit < h˜
(1.29)
We assume:
bψ(hit) ∈ (0, σ), ψ(0) = ψ0 > 0, ψ(∞) = ψMax <∞, ψ0 > ψ¯ and ψ′(hit) > 0.
(A1)
In previous studies on child labour, low level poverty traps emerge due to
non-convexities in utility functions (Basu and Van 1998) or production func-
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tions (Hazan and Berdugo 2002; Chakrabarti and Das 2005b). In contrast
this paper points towards a third possibility: non-convexities in mortality
functions that arise due to the presence of (local) health externalities. This
approach is closely related to Chakrabarti and Das (2005b) who also analyse
the impact of non-convexities in mortality on inequality. The mechanism that
generates persistence of inequality here may be explained as a combination
of two factors: First, local externalities in the form of parental human capital
affects a child’s human capital (a) directly, by appearing as an input in the
human capital production function, (b) but also indirectly, by affecting the
mortality function. Second, the impact of the local externality on the mor-
tality function takes the form of a threshold that we have described above.
For households with low human capital, adult health is more responsive to
any increase in health spending i.e. elasticity of the life expectancy function
is high. This means that the additional utility derived from consumption of
health expenditure throttles investment in human capital, condemning the
entire household to a low level poverty trap. Household with higher human
capital derive lower returns from health and thus transfer larger resources
to human capital development. In this way low human capital and poor
health can combine to produce persistent inequalities. Of course there is no
necessary reason why inequalities ought to be persistent. Below, we discuss
various cases that can emerge.
Denote the human capital dynamics in public and private regimes by
hit+1
PU = B(hit
PU) and hit+1
PV = A(hit
PV ) respectively. In the set up
outlined here, if household incomes lie below some critical threshold, the
elasticity of mortality with respect to health expenditures is increasing in
human capital. On the other hand, households that are fortunate enough to
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lie above this threshold have constant elasticity rates. Since human capital is
inversely related to the elasticity of the mortality function, richer households
end up spending larger amounts on their children’s human capital. In a
private regime, the dynamics are:
hit+1
PV = A(hit
PV ) =

∆2(hit
PV )1−β if hit
PV ≥ h˜
∆˜2(hit
PV )1−β if hit
PV < h˜
(1.30)
Where ∆2 = (wtα)
α(β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1 + γ)
bψ¯ + (α + β)(1− σ)
)α+β
and
∆˜2 = (wtα)
α(β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1 + γ)
bψ(hit
PV ) + (α + β)(1− σ)
)α+β
.
Similarly, in a public regime, the dynamics are:
hit+1
PU = B(hit
PU) =

∆1h¯t
α
(hit
PU)1−α−β if hit
PU ≥ h˜
∆˜1h¯t
α
(hit
PU)1−α−β if hit
PU < h˜
(1.31)
Where ∆1 = (τwt)
α(β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1− τ + γ)
(bψ¯ + β(1− σ))
)β
and
∆˜1 = (τwt)
α(β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1− τ + γ)
(bψ(hit
PU) + β(1− σ))
)β
Notice that this also means that child labour increases for hit
j < h˜
(j = PU, PV ) but above this threshold it drops to some constant. As in Bhat-
tacharya and Qiao (2007), there is a distinct possibility of non-monotonic
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dynamics. But for what follows, we will only analyse cases where this is not
so i.e. we assume that there is a positive relation between human capital
of parents and children (Becker and Tomes 1986). This can be ensured by
choosing a suitable functional form for ψ(hit
j)6. In the dynamical systems
above depending on the values of h˜, B(hit
PV ) and A(hit
PU) could have multi-
ple equilibria or a unique one. The following proposition clarifies the human
capital dynamics. Let hjP and hjR denote low level and high level steady
states. The dynamics of human capital are summarized by the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 In both public and private education regimes, if the adult
mortality function given in (2.9) satisfies (A1), then the human capital ac-
cumulation equation for dynasty i ( j = PU, PV) could have :
• Multiple steady states (two non-trivial steady states and one trivial un-
stable equilibrium)
lim
t→+∞
hjit =

hjR if hjit ≥ h˜
hjP if hjit < h˜
• A unique low-level human capital trap such that:
lim
t→+∞
hjit = h
jP
• A unique high-level human capital equilibrium such that:
lim
t→+∞
hjit = h
jR
6If the elasticity of ψ is sufficiently small then dht+1dht will always be positive.
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Proof: See Appendix.
Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 show these possibilities for the ith dynasty. This
proposition suggests that distributional dynamics can be extremely com-
plicated. Intuitively, with multiple equilibria there is a tendency towards
polarization, while with a unique equilibrium inequalities are temporary. We
discuss these distributional dynamics in the following section.
Distributional Dynamics and the Evolution of Child Labour
With a unique steady state, there is convergence in the long run. With
multiple equilibria there are a number of complexities that arise and in some
cases the distribution does exhibit polarization. To illustrate the distribu-
tional dynamics with multiple equilibria consider a simple illustration. Let us
begin with a private education regime. Following Galor and Tsiddon (1996,
1997) lets assume that there exist two classes of agents: Rich agents who
begin with h˜ amount of capital, and poor agents who start below the thresh-
old, say at hjP 7. Let Lt
P and Lt
R be the number of poor and rich agents at
time t. Starting from t = 0, rich agents continue to invest in human capital
until they converge towards the high level steady state hjR. On the other
hand poorer agents who begin with an initial human capital of hjP , have no
incentive to invest (since they are already at a equilibrium). It is evident
therefore that the steady state distribution is marked by a polarization of
7In other words richer agents begin in the basin of attraction of the high level equilib-
rium while poorer agents begin at the low level equilibrium.
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human capital:
lim
t→+∞
Gt(h
PV
it ) =

hPV,R with mass of L∗R
hPV,P with mass of L∗P
In the public education regime, though the local externality generates
polarization, there is an additional force at work. The public input into ed-
ucation serves as a global externality that connects poor and rich dynasties.
If this global externality is strong enough, it may result in a “trickle down”
effect as benefits of human capital flow down from richest to poorest house-
holds. To understand the role of the public input, let us take an extreme
example. Assume that the public input takes the following form:
Et =

δ2 if ht ≥ h˜
δ1 if ht < h˜
where δ2 > δ1
The equation above shows that as average human capital crosses a thresh-
old, public input jumps from a lower to a higher value. Though extremely
simple, this example brings out the basic role of the public input. Figure 1.5
shows possible dynamics of human capital. The figure depicts two paths of
human capital. The lower curve which we denote by h(ht, δ1) is associated
with a lower level of public expenditure. If average human capital lies above
the threshold, then the relevant dynamics are given by h(ht, δ2). As before let
us think of a situation in which at time zero, LP poor agents find themselves
at the point hjP . It is clear that they have no incentive to invest in human
capital. On the other hand richer agents with initial wealth h˜ accumulate
wealth and begin to converge to hjR. So even if h0 < h˜, it is still possible
that at some finite time t∗ > 0, the average human capital, ht∗ may come to
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exceed the threshold. If this happens, the entire human capital curve shifts
upwards to h(ht, δ2) and the low level steady state disappears. If this shift
was to occur poorer families would begin to accumulate human capital and
over time inequalities would reduce.
Unlike the previous case with homogeneous agents, in the modified model,
child labour becomes a function of parental human capital and therefore is no
longer a constant. This generates explicit dynamics for child labour. If there
exists a unique equilibrium then two possibilities arise. If the unique equilib-
rium is hjR then child labour increases at initial stages of development but
begins to decline at later stages. Figure 1.4 depicts this situation for multiple
thresholds in the survival function. The curve initially increases, reaches a
maximum and eventually starts declining in step like functions. This resem-
bles an “inverted-U” shaped pattern, something that has been observed in
the empirical study of Basu, Das and Dutta (2010). On the other hand if
the unique equilibrium in hjP , child labour is persistent even in the long run.
With multiple equilibria, child labour is higher amongst poorer dynasties
and there is no trend towards an “inverted-U” shaped pattern both at an
individual level and at an aggregate level. Here the role of global externali-
ties become crucial. In a public education regime, the “trickle down” effect
may eliminate the low level equilibrium and an “inverted-U” shaped pattern
might emerge in the long run. The impact of school quality on reducing child
labour has been confirmed by (Ray 2003). The novel aspect of these results
is that human capital drives these varied dynamics through its impact on life
expectancy.
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1.5 Child Labour: A Temporary Stage of
Development?
In the model without heterogeneity child labour is a function of parameters
and is completely independent of household wealth. Though this seems un-
realistic at the first glance, what the results suggest is that there maybe no
endogenous economic mechanisms that generate reductions in child labour.
Thus external interventions and anti-child labour legislations may have an
important role to play in eliminating child labour. Historically, child labour
was rampant in 19th century Britain and United States, but state interven-
tion against child employment (Factory Acts in Britain, Compulsory Ed-
ucation laws in United States) had a decisive impact in bringing children
into schools and away from the labour market. Nonetheless household child
labour decisions cannot be completely independent of household character-
istics. Therefore household wealth, parental human capital levels and most
importantly, adult life expectancy, may all be crucial elements. It is well
known that Europe witnessed significant reductions in child labour in the
last half of the 19th century. Cunningham (1996) and Humphries (2003)
note that child labour in Britain declined, though in a somewhat erratic
fashion, from 1850 onwards, with a strong downward trend from 1870 on-
wards. The rise in life expectancy on the other hand seems to have pre dated
the reductions in child labour (Cutler et al. 2006). If true, this suggests that
life expectancy and child labour may have exhibited the sort of pattern that
our results support: initial increases in life expectancy could have been com-
patible with high levels of child labour, but sustained improvements in life
expectancy could have eventually decreased child employment. Of course,
whether a similar logic is applicable to contemporary developing nations is a
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complex question, though as we have noted, economists like Paul Krugman
seem to agree with the “inverted-U” shaped hypothesis. Empirical studies
on this issue provide mixed evidence8. Basu, Das and Dutta (2010) confirm
the existence of an “inverted-U” shaped relation between child labour and
landed wealth. Using data from Indian states, Kambhampati and Rajan
(2006) support the hypothesis (with respect to income). On the other hand,
drawing on data from western India Swaminathan (1998) finds that child
labour increases with income growth. The model outlined above provides
explanations for these conflicting results.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the interrelation between human capital, child labour and
adult mortality. The results show that local externalities and threshold ef-
fects in the mortality function can lead to multiple equilibria. As a result
initial inequalities in human capital generate mortality differentials, which in
turn cause long run polarization of the distribution. Thus differences in life
expectancy can be a crucial channel through which inequality and poverty
are transmitted across generations. While local externalities are specific to
a particular household, global externalities form a connection across house-
holds, thereby counteracting the process of polarization. In a public educa-
tion regime the public input performs the function of a global externality. If
the compensatory effect emanating from the public input is strong enough,
long run distribution does not exhibit polarization even in the presence of
thresholds in the mortality function.
8Se Fors (2012) for a survey
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These results also indicate that life expectancy is a crucial determinant of
child labour decisions. Less educated parents face a higher risk of mortality
and are more likely to send children to work than to school. Thus there is
a possibility for poorer families to get stuck in a child labour trap. Families
with high initial human capital can escape this fate. On the other hand, un-
der certain conditions the interaction of human capital and life expectancy
could also generate an “inverted-U” shaped pattern of child labour i.e. initial
stages of development are marked by an increase in child labour while later
stages witness a decline. The novel contribution of the paper is to show how
the “inverted-U” pattern emerges because of the interaction between life ex-
pectancy and parental human capital.
From a policy perspective our analysis suggests that child labour could
be a persistent phenomenon in which case concerted efforts by the state
and other agencies to reduce child employment may be required. Policy
interventions could take two forms: Legislative and punitive policies aimed at
directly penalizing the use of child labour (like bans and penalties of various
sorts) or investments in public infrastructure aimed at improving returns
from schooling. The first sort of policy is, in itself, unlikely to enhance
human capital. However when combined with public investments, punitive
actions against child labour may enhance human capital. In a model with
heterogeneous agents and threshold externalities, public inputs could play an
important role in distributing the benefits of growth to the entire economy
thereby reducing child labour and long run inequality.
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CHAPTER 2
CHILD LABOUR, HUMAN CAPITAL
ACCUMULATION AND FOREIGN AID
2.1 Introduction
Child labour today is a global phenomenon. The importance and perva-
siveness of child labour in our world today can be judged by the fact that
12 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 14 are employed as child
labourers. At a disaggregated level the trends are less than comforting. Be-
tween 2004 and 2008 child labourers in the 5-14 year category declined from
over 170 million to around 152 million. The number of child labourers in the
15-17 year category, however, have increased from 52 million in 2004 to 62
million in 2008 (Diallo et al. 2010). Facts regarding children employed in
hazardous occupations reveals that in 2008 a large portion of child labourers
continue to be employed in hazardous industries.
It is clear that substantial progress has been made in reducing child
labour, but the dimensions of the problem continue to be daunting. Given
the enormity of the issue, a large literature on child labour has emerged.
This paper is closely related to a particular strand of this literature that
concentrates on the interrelationship between fertility, mortality and child
labour. Chakraborty and Das (2005a) analyse child labour in an old age se-
curity model where adults face mortality risks. Mortality risks translate into
a lower discount on future consumption, making poorer parents less likely
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to invest in child quality. Strulik (2004) analyzes a model with endogenous
fertility and educational decisions, where high levels of child mortality may
lead to stagnation of the economy. Eswaran (2000) and Baland and Este-
van (2007) analyse an old age security set up with young adult mortality to
model child labour under imperfect markets1.
Historically, most mortality reductions have occurred at early stages of
life (Kalemli-Ozcan 2008). Given this fact, the relationship between infant
mortality (as opposed to young adult mortality or adult mortality) and child
labour becomes all the more relevant. This paper introduces infant mortal-
ity into an old age security model similar to Chakraborty and Das (2005).
Following Doepke (2005) and Azarnert (2006) we assume decisions regarding
schooling and child labour are made ex-post i.e. after mortality risks have
occurred. In that sense infant mortality may be interpreted as a health en-
dowment. The crucial feature of an old age security model is that children
are a source of future income. Parents must then decide whether to invest
in child quality by increasing schooling which leads to greater human capital
in the future, or to invest in child quantity by increasing fertility. Poor par-
ents have large families and send their children to work rather than to school.
At very low levels of parental human capital, child labour traps might emerge.
If child labour is a detriment to economic progress, then its elimination
has to become an integral aspect of economic policy. On the one hand, mar-
ket forces themselves have proven to be potent forces in reducing the demand
for child labour. Technological progress and increased competition, in 19th
century Britain and United States, forced employers to replace the labour of
1Baland and Estevan (2007) do not endogenize fertility decisions.
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children with the more skilled and more productive labour of adults. In the
British textile industries for instance, the introduction of steam power in the
early 19th century led to a decrease in the recruitment of children (Nardinelli
1980). In the United States too, the use of mechanical pickers in coal mines
lead to substantial reductions in child employment (Hindman 2002). On the
other hand, active state intervention and regulation has also helped in con-
trolling child labour. Examples of such intervention include abolition of child
labour, minimum age restrictions, compulsory education supported by cash
transfer schemes etc. British Factory acts of 1833, the National Recovery
Act of 1933 in the United States are important examples of successful anti-
child labour legislations (Humphries 2003). What was true in the nineteenth
century is also true for modern developing countries. Brazil’s Bolsa Escola
programme, Mexico’s Progresa or South Korea’s compulsory education drives
have played a significant role in getting children into schools (Weiner 1991,
Schultz 2004).
In addition to the factors described above, growing international activism
against child labour has begun to play a significant role in modern day pol-
icy making. In this context there is a growing debate about the role of
international agencies and developed countries in reducing child employment
(Jafarey and Lahiri 2002, Neumayer and de Soysa 2005, Kitaura 2009, ILO
2010). Since a large share of development spending in LDC’s is being financed
by foreign sources, the link between child labour and foreign aid needs to be
carefully analysed. In this paper we analyse the effectiveness of foreign aid
in tackling child employment. We find that cash transfers and compulsory
education systems funded via foreign aid, can play an important role in the
elimination of child labour.
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Broadly speaking, this paper points to some important implications for
policies that are designed to eliminate child labour. Previous literature has
supported the hypothesis that improvements in health are sufficient to re-
duce child labour. In contrast, this paper shows that the relation between
health and child labour is far more complex and that improvements in hu-
man capital are more likely to generate powerful incentives to eliminate child
labour. Similar results have been obtained by Azarnet (2006) and Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007) though in a different context. These findings point to
the substantial role that can be played by direct and concerted policies like
conditional cash transfers and compulsory education laws, especially when
they are funded by foreign aid. These findings are in stark contrast with
studies (like Azarnert 2008) which have found foreign aid funded cash trans-
fers to be detrimental to human capital accumulation.
2.2 The Environment
Consider a three period OLG model. During the first period, agents spend
their time endowments on schooling (et) and on child labour (lt). During
the second period, adult agents spend their time endowments on child-care
and on labour market participation. In this model fertility is endogenously
determined by the adult. z1 denotes the cost per birth. Note that a child
plays a passive role in this model. Schooling and child labour decisions are
taken entirely by adults. Moreover, as we have mentioned earlier, schooling
and child labour decisions are taken ex-post i.e. after mortality has occurred
(Azarnert 2006, Doepke 2005). In the third period, old agents receive a share
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of their children’s human capital as old age security.
We denote the probability of survival by a function P (.). To simplify
analysis we assume that the survival rate is exogenously given2. Human cap-
ital of an adult depends on the schooling he received as a child. The human
capital production function is given by a simple linear function (Chakraborty
and Das 2005a):
Ht+1 = H(et) = γ(1 + et), γ > 0 (2.1)
Note that this production function assumes that each individual is endowed
with at least one unit of human capital at birth, irrespective of the amount of
schooling received. The old-age security structure in Chakraborty and Das
(2005a) implies that surviving children donate α of their adult incomes to
the elders in the family.
2.2.1 Fertility and Schooling Choice
Each adult solves the following utility maximization problem:
maximize
et,nt
U(ct) + βU(ct+1)
2Like in Azarnert (2006), we could endogenize infant survival, by making it a function
of parental human capital and child cost z1, but this would not change the results of this
paper.
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s.t.
ct = w(1− et)ntP + (1− α)(1− z1nt)Ht (2.2)
ct+1 = αPntHt+1 (2.3)
0 ≤ et ≤ 1, nt ≥ 1 et + lt = 1, w > 0 (2.4)
The period 1 budget constraint consists of two components: child labour
income and adult income. Adult and child wage rates are given by γ and w
respectively. Old-age consumption depends on the transfers made by adults
to the elderly, which implies that nt ≥ 1. In addition we make the following
assumption:
w < γ; (A1)
(A1) ensures adult labour is more productive than child labour, thus ensuring
that returns to education are high enough. Maximising the objective function
with respect to the constraints set out above we obtain the following F.O.C’s:
nt : [w(1− et)P − (1− α)z1Ht]U ′(ct) + βαPHt+1U ′(ct+1) ≤ 0 (2.5)
et : −wntPU ′(ct) + βαntP dHt+1
det
U ′(ct+1) ≤ 0 (2.6)
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From this it follows:
U ′(ct)
βU ′(ct+1)
≥ αPHt+1
(1− α)Htz1 − wP (1− et) ≡ Rt
n (2.7)
U ′(ct)
βU ′(ct+1)
≥ αγ
w
≡ Rte (2.8)
The R.H.S of (2.7) and (2.8) are the returns to fertility (Rn) and school-
ing (Re) respectively. They show the cost of future consumption relative
to current consumption. In Chakraborty and Das (2005a: 275) increases in
adult survival rates imply that “Healthier parents who expect to live longer
behave more patiently and are more willing to substitute toward old-age
consumption. The way they do so is by investing in their children’s future
productivity.” As soon as we introduce infant mortality into the model things
change dramatically. An exogenous increase in P , reduces the fertility costs
incurred by adults and increase future utility derived from children i.e. re-
turns to fertility are increasing in P .
Assuming U(.) = ln(.), the optimal schooling and fertility decisions are
given by:
et =

β − 1
1 + β
+
β
1 + β
1− α
wP
(1− z1)Ht if et−1 ≥ e˜
0 if et−1 < e˜
(2.9)
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nt =

1 if et−1 > e˜
β
1 + β
(1− α)Ht
(1− α)Htz1 − wP if et−1 < e˜
(2.10)
Where e˜ is determined by setting Re ≤ Rn and et = 0. Simplifying we get e˜
= ( 2wP
(1−α)z1γ )− 1.
The optimal schooling and fertility decisions imply that when parental
schooling is below e˜, children are not schooled at all and fertility rates are
greater than 1. Above e˜, fertility is at its lowest value. Notice that in this
case schooling is a normal good, so that increases in the income of parents
increases its demand.
There are two additional facts that are worth noting. First, schooling
in (2.9) is positively related to γ (adult wage) and negatively relate to w
(child wage). Increases in relative child wages (w
γ
)increases the opportunity
cost of studying, in terms of foregone child labour income and thus discour-
ages schooling3. Second, like Azarnert (2006) our model predicts that an
exogenous increase in P might reduce the time spent in school and increase
fertility rates4. Since child survival is already observed by parents before
they make schooling decisions, one possible interpretation of P is that it is a
3Basu and Van (1998) refer to the substitutability between adult and child labour as
the substitutability axiom.
4Acemoglu and Johnson (2007: 975) conduct an empirical investigation into the re-
lationship between life expectancy and GDP growth have conclude that “There is no
evidence that the increase in life expectancy led to faster growth of income per capita or
output per worker. This evidence casts doubt on the view that health has a first order
impact on economic growth.” This anomaly is explained in terms of the impact of life
expectancy on population: As life expectancy increases so does the population size and
this reduces growth at least in the short run.
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child health endowment. Thus the above results suggest that parental invest-
ments in children vary inversely with child health endowments i.e. parents
compensate children who are worse of in terms of their health, with more
schooling. This could be interpreted as a “preference for equality”5. This
relationship can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Under the assumption (A1) and given equations(2.9) and
(2.10), an exogenous increase in the health endowment of a child:
1. Increases the incidence of child labour (decreases schooling time) and
leaves fertility unchanged if parental schooling is greater than e˜.
2. Leaves child labour unchanged but increases the fertility rate if parental
schooling is below e˜.
Proof The proof follows from optimal fertility and schooling decisions in (2.9)
and (2.10) above.
Notice that the proposition does not rule out the possibility that improve-
ments in P - through some endogenous mechanism- could alleviate the child
labour problem. The results only suggest that exogenous increases in P are
insufficient to generate such changes. To understand the point, let us assume
that P is actually endogenous. Following Azarnert (2006), let us endogenize
the mortality risk function as follows:
P (Ht) =

1 if Ht ≥ H˜
(Ht)
δ if Ht < H˜
(2.11)
5See Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982) for a discussion
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Where P (Ht) is an increasing function of Ht. Substituting this function into
(2.9) we see, that as each generation becomes more educated, infant mor-
tality declines until the economy reaches a point where it becomes zero (P
becomes unity). What is important is that the reductions in child labour
are not driven directly by increases in infant mortality, but by increases in
human capital.
In recent times there has been a proliferation of philanthropic initiatives
aimed at child welfare (The Gates Foundation is one such example). In light
of the above findings these policy makers and activists need to contend with
intricate behavioural responses of poor families while designing and executing
welfare policies. Improving health is an important end in itself and ought to
be a crucial component of development policies. However the results suggest
that these policies in themselves cannot replace direct and concerted efforts
at reducing child employment. Two important insights can be drawn from
the results presented above. First, since schooling is a normal good, an ex-
ogenous increase in family income (funded by foreign aid for instance) should
increase schooling and thus decrease child labour. However, the implications
of such measures on schooling and fertility decisions will depend largely on
the incentives -mediated via complex income and substitution effects- that it
generates. Second, the results suggest that increases in human capital consti-
tute the primary driving force behind reductions in child labour. This implies
that human capital augmenting policies like compulsory schooling laws could
be extremely effective in tackling the problem of child labour. These insights
form a background to our subsequent analysis of policy interventions.
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2.3 Child Labour and Compulsory Education: The
Role of Foreign Aid
The elimination of child labour has a long and complex history. In the
19th and 20th centuries, the problem of child labour in Britain and United
States was so severe that its elimination became a priority amongst legis-
lators, abolitionists and trade unions alike. Anti-child labour legislations-
from outright bans on child labour to minimum age restrictions - became an
integral part of child labour eradication strategies across these countries. A
popular and effective anti-child labour legislation was compulsory schooling.
The experiences of both Britain and the United States confirm the success
that these policies have had in reducing child labour (Stambler 1968, Weiner
1991, Hindman 2002).
Compulsory schooling, though directed at improving a nation’s human
capital, has an indirect effect on child labour by effectively reducing its sup-
ply. In countries with large informal sectors harsher restrictions like bans
or international sanctions tend to in-formalize child labour, making children
more rather than less vulnerable in the long run (Humphries 2003). Examples
are numerous. In the early 20th century, the child labour abolition move-
ment in America had reached a fever pitch. Shifting industrial production
directly to the homes of poor families provided a convenient way for employ-
ers to make use of child labour without facing any liabilities associated with
it (Hindman 2002). More recently, in 1996, Bangladeshi child labourers were
forced into hazardous occupations (including prostitution) after the garments
industry fired a number of them under the threat of international boycotts
(UNICEF 1997).
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The success of compulsory education however, depends on a host of fac-
tors, including a sound legal system that is capable of enforcing laws, public
awareness about the importance of education, effective educational infras-
tructure, etc. Additionally, in countries where education is unaffordable or
returns to private education are too low, an effective policy would require
additional subsidies to augment household incomes making schooling more
attractive. Resources for such a massive effort can come from a variety of
sources. In recent years foreign aid has become an important source of fund-
ing development projects. Foreign aid directed towards education is now
an important part of foreign aid flows. DAC countries for instance have in-
creased annual aid flows by 1332 percent between 1993-1996 and 2002-2004
(Asiedu and Nandwa 2007). Foreign aid has been particularly effective in
reducing child labour and increasing schooling in Africa (ILO 2010).
This section analyses the role of foreign aid and cash transfers in tackling
child labour. Following Azarnert (2008), we assume that total foreign aid
Ft can be spent in two forms: a cash transfer conditional on the number of
children i.e. a child support scheme (Tt) or as an investment in the public
education system (Gt) that guarantees a certain mandatory level of education
µt. This implies:
Ft = TtntP +Gt (2.12)
Compulsory education effectively reduces child labour participation rates
by an amount 1 ≥ µt ≥ 0. Even though it is not entirely realistic, we
assume laws are enforced without any transaction costs. The human capital
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technology is given by a simple linear function:
Ht+1 = γ(1 + µt + et). (2.13)
The technology is linear in private education et and the compulsory ed-
ucation level µt. This is similar to the human capital production function
adopted by Azarnert (2010) in the sense that this technology treats private
education and compulsory education as substitutes. The optimization prob-
lem for an adult agent becomes:
maximize
et,nt
U(ct) + βU(ct+1)
s.t.
ct = w(1− µt − et)ntP + (1− α)(1− z1nt)Ht + TtntP
ct+1 = αPntHt+1
0 ≤ et ≤ 1− µt, nt ≥ 1, et + lt = 1− µt
Assuming U(.) = ln(.), the optimal schooling and fertility decisions are6:
6Subject also, to the time constraint 1− z1nt ≥ 0
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et =

β
1 + β
(
Tt
w
+
1− α
wP
(1− z1)Ht
)
+
(β − 1)
(1 + β)
− µt ifet−1 ≥ e∗∗
0 ifet−1 < e∗∗
(2.14)
nt =

1 ifet−1 ≥ e∗∗
β
1 + β
(
(1− α)Ht
(1− α)Htz1 − TtP − wP (1− µt)
)
ifet−1 < e∗∗
(2.15)
Where e∗∗ = 2wP+TtP
(1−α)z1γ −1−µt−1. The optimal solutions lead us to the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 1. Above e∗∗ and for a given µt, an increase in child sup-
port transfers (Tt) reduce the incidence of child labour. These transfers
do not affect fertility which are at their lower bound.
2. Below e∗∗ and for a given µt, an increase in child support transfers (Tt)
increases fertility.
3. Below e∗∗ foreign aid funded compulsory education (µt) decreases fer-
tility.
Proof Follows from the optimal schooling and fertility decisions.
The positive relation between education aid and schooling is supported
by a number of studies (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008, ILO 2010).
Interestingly, unlike the model of foreign aid funded schooling in Azarnert
(2008), here cash transfers to households in the form of child support, in-
creases human capital by increasing schooling at least for those households
where parental education is above e∗∗, even while increasing fertility for the
lower income classes. This makes it difficult to judge the efficacy of such
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policies since fertility increases are often associated with higher dependency
ratios. Fertility increasing effects of foreign aid, however, need not necessar-
ily be interpreted as a failure of foreign aid policies as long as educational
attainment is increasing. Nag (1980: 580), for instance argues that:
“In making predictions about fertility and in evaluating the fertility im-
pact of any development or family-planning program, the fertility- increasing
effects of modernization are often overlooked. The tendency of the fertility
level to remain the same or even to rise should not necessarily be interpreted
as a failure of a development program to generate any demand for birth con-
trol or of a family-planning program to provide any effective service”.
Note that, child subsidies distort the income distribution: e∗∗ increases
with Tt. In contrast compulsory education (µt) leaves e
∗∗ unchanged. It is
also worth noting that an increase in P lowers human capital by reducing
private schooling et, but has no effect on µt. This implies that if health
interventions are supplemented by compulsory education, then the negative
relation between human capital and P disappears.
Having said this, it must be noted that the impact of aid on child labour
and fertility crucially depends on the way aid policies are designed. In the
example above the impact of cash transfers can be very different if they
are made conditional on child schooling, i.e. Ft = Gt + TtetntPt. Here
cash transfers to families depend on the time spent by children in school.
In this case the optimal solutions for schooling and fertility are (under the
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assumption w > Tt):
et =

β
1 + β
(
w(1− µt)
w − Tt +
(1− α)
(w − Tt)P (1− z1)Ht
)
− (1 + µt)
1 + β
ifet−1 ≥ eˆ
0 ifet−1 < eˆ
(2.16)
nt =

1 ifet−1 ≥ eˆ
β
1 + β
(1− α)Ht
(1− α)Htz1 − wP (1− µt) ifet−1 < eˆ
(2.17)
Where eˆ = 2wP−TtP (1+µt)
(1−α)z1γ −1−µt−1 Notice that though cash transfers no longer
effect fertility they continue to have a positive impact on schooling7. Our
results suggest that the effect of foreign aid on schooling and fertility finally
depends on the economic incentives that it generates. Once cash transfers
are made conditional on schooling adult agents have a greater incentive to
increase schooling without distorting their fertility decisions. Moreover, eˆ is
decreasing in both the cash transfer, Tt and compulsory education, µt. Pre-
vious empirical studies have shown that conditional cash transfer schemes
are effective in reducing child employment (Schultz 2004, Miller and Tsoka
2012). The results presented above support this claim.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the relationship between child labour and for-
eign aid in a model with infant mortality and endogenous fertility. The
results show that exogenous increases in health endowments alone, cannot
7Analysing enrolment and fertility data, Schultz (2004) observes that conditional cash
transfers increase schooling without affecting fertility. Zhang(1997) analyses the impact
of tax financed school subsidies and finds that these policies reduce fertility and increase
human capital
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increase child schooling. These results suggest that the goal of eradicating
child labour can be better served through policies that directly confront bar-
riers to human capital accumulation and schooling. Foreign aid could have
an important role to play in this regard. In particular, cash transfers and
compulsory education funded through foreign aid have a negative effect on
child labour. The impact of foreign aid on fertility however, depends on the
way the welfare program is structured. Cash transfers that are conditional
on the time spent in school, do not affect fertility while unconditional cash
transfers in the form of child support have a positive effect on fertility.
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CHAPTER 3
FDI IN BRAZIL AND INDIA: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between institutions and economic development has been
at the center of development economics since the times of Adam Smith. Re-
cently there has been a resurgence of interest in this area. North (1991,
p. 97) defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct),
and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)”. Given the inherent
uncertainty and complexity of modern economies, appropriate economic in-
stitutions make markets more efficient. This is also the case of foreign direct
investment (FDI), as has been stressed in the literature (Dunning 1998, Go¨rg
2005, Busse and Hefeker 2007, Meon and Sekkat 2007, Seyoum 2011).
For those who believe that “institutions matter”, two questions emerge:
How do alternative institutional arrangements affect the quality and pace of
economic development? How do such institutions emerge in the first place?
The answer to the first question may be obtained by comparing alternative
experiences. The answer to the second question requires a historical perspec-
tive. It is within this framework that we present a comparative analysis of
Brazil and India’s past and recent experiences with FDI.
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Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005) investigate the im-
pact of colonialism on institutional and economic development of nations.
They argue that the biggest impact of colonialism was on economic institu-
tions. In settler colonies, the colonizing nations established institutions that
protected property rights for broad masses. This resulted in an egalitarian
distribution of political power. By doing so, basic ingredients for devel-
opment were put in place. In other colonies, where European settlements
where restricted, the colonizing power established “extractive” institutions
that were inimical to progress. These political and economic structures once
established persisted even after the colonies became independent, resulting
in divergent patterns of growth.
In this paper we concentrate on FDI and argue that the contrasting FDI
policies in Brazil and India can be traced back to differences in the respec-
tive colonial (or semi-colonial) experiences of the two nations during the
19th century. However our analysis differs from the “colonialism-institutions
hypothesis” in several ways. Colonialism in Brazil and India lead to two
divergent processes: On the one hand, regressive political and economic in-
stitutions (slavery, regressive land tenure systems, lopsided distribution of
political power etc.) emerged. On the other hand, colonial exploitation led
to another set of consequences: disenfranchisement amongst the masses and
sections of the elite (especially the industrial elite) who sought to break from
the international division of labour that had restricted their economies into
exporters of primary commodities. One therefore finds that after indepen-
dence, though a number of colonial institutions remained, a number of others
were dismantled.
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The emergence of a proactive state and the initiation of import sub-
stituting industrialization were the biggest institutional changes that were
introduced in the 20th century. However, the specific differences in historical
experiences led these countries to adopt different sets of policies even within
a state lead ISI framework. In Brazil, the state and domestic class interests
aligned themselves in such a way so as to provide space for FDI in the indus-
trialization process. In contrast, in India the post-colonial society established
institutions that restricted FDI in the economy until the neo-liberal era. The
basic scheme of our argument can thus be explained as follows:
19th century historical factors → Institutional persistence and institu-
tional rupture → role of FDI in the economy → Industrial growth
In the first two sections of this article we shall briefly review the func-
tion of foreign investments both prior to and during the process of import
substituting industrialization (ISI) in each country. The following section we
analyze the changing role of FDI in the neo-liberal era, when ISI was aban-
doned. Following this, we then analyze the contemporary role of FDI in the
respective economies, and then examine the advantages and disadvantages
the different policies towards foreign capital have had on the development
process of each country.
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3.2 FDI in Historical Perspective
3.2.1 Brazil
In the early years after independence (from 1822 to the 1850s) foreign in-
vestments (mostly of British origin) were mainly concentrated in finance and
trade. The production of export products (coffee and sugar) was dominated
by local residents, while the shipping and the financing of trade was in the
hands of foreigners. In the second half of the 19th century the Brazilian
government encouraged foreign capital to build the country’s infrastructure
railroads, ports, and urban public utilities. Much of these investments were
designed to better integrate Brazil into the world’s trading network as a sup-
plier of primary goods. In 1880 the total stock of foreign investments were
estimated at US $ 190 million; this expanded to US $ 1.9 billion by 1914 and
to US $ 2.6 billion by 1930. Prior to 1930 Britain was the dominant foreign
investor; it still accounted for 50 percent of foreign investment in that year,
though the United States share was rapidly increasing, already accounting
for 25 percent of total foreign investments.
Although foreign investments contributed resources and technology to
Brazil in the years prior to 1930, many observers had misgivings about the
type of growth it helped to foster and its often overlooked costs to the country.
Railroads and ports were built to integrate more effectively the agricultural
sectors of the interior into the international economy. By doing this, however,
the resulting national transportation system did not link together various ge-
ographical regions and thus did not create a large internal market.
It was the Brazilian government (at both the central and state levels) who
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took the initiative in getting foreign groups to invest in the country by offering
various types of incentives. In the case of railroads, for example, foreign com-
panies were granted guaranteed rates of return on their investments1. The
early construction of electricity generation plants and distribution systems
were dominated by foreign firms, which were attracted by the government’s
willingness to allow high electricity tariffs.
By the 1930s, however, the Brazilian government changed its attitude
towards foreign investors in public utilities. Tariffs on electricity, telephone
services and public transportation were more tightly controlled and were not
readjusted to the likings of the foreign concession owners2. After World War
II, until the 1990s, most public utilities were taken over by either the federal
or state governments. The public sector also took over most of the exploita-
tion of natural resources.
With the adoption of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) as the
country’s main strategy of economic development, FDI was given a central
role for creating new manufacturing sectors behind protective walls.
3.2.2 India
Foreign investment in India in the 19th and 20th centuries was dominated
by British investment. British capital was mainly invested in export oriented
sectors such as jute, tea and coal. It also had the major role in the construc-
1The burden of guaranteeing a minimum rate of return to foreign-owned railways be-
came so onerous that the government began to borrow money abroad after the turn of the
century to gradually buy them. By 1929 almost half were in government hands and by
1953 94 percent had been nationalized. See Villela and Suzigan, (1973, p. 397-399).
2In the case of Brazil foreign investments in public utilities -like railroads and electricity
generation and/or distribution - was allowed under a regime of concession contracts, which
granted temporary monopolies to provide services.
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tion of railways and had a substantial presence in trade and finance. While
exact data regarding foreign investments in India during the colonial era is
not available, in a rigorous reconstruction of Indian balance of payments,
Banerji (1963) puts foreign investment in India at US$ 61 million for the
year 1921 and US $ 83 million in 19383. The Reserve Bank of India (Central
bank of India) analyzed foreign capital in India for the year 1948 and esti-
mated it to be between US $ 46 and 64 million (Tomlinson 1978). In view
of the above estimates, it would be safe to conclude that foreign investment
in India during the 19th and early 20th century was negligible and that it
did show signs of increasing during the early decades of the 20th century
(Tomlinson 1978).
The first half of the 20th century witnessed two important changes in the
structure of foreign investment in India. First, foreign investments in the
pre-1920 period were essentially in the form of portfolio capital. Moreover it
was heavily concentrated in the primary sector and in utilities and transport
sectors. By the 1930’s there seems to be evidence suggesting that FDI, as
opposed to portfolio investment, had started to dominate total private for-
eign investment (Tomlinson 1978). Second, the favourable terms of trade in
the pre-World-War I era, followed by the economic depression of the 1930’s,
allowed Indian firms to gain access to sectors that were previously dominated
by foreign firms. In 1914, 70 percent of banking deposits were under the con-
trol of foreign firms, but by 1947 this was reduced to 17 percent (Mukherjee
and Mukherjee 1988). Similarly Indian companies had started to dominate
the insurance sector (Mukherjee and Mukherjee 1988).
3As quoted in Tomlinson (1978). The British shares were 80% and 73% respectively.
52
The crucial feature of 20th century India was the rise of an industrial elite,
who viewed colonialism as the biggest obstacle to their advancement. The
history of industrial development in India had convinced the ruling classes of
the importance of state protection in providing stimulus to industrial growth.
As a result, they favored extensive state regulation of the economy.
3.3 FDI in the Import Substitution Era
3.3.1 Brazil
With the adoption of ISI as Brazil’s main development strategy, foreign in-
vestments shifted to the manufacturing sector (rising from 23.7 percent in
1929 to 74.6 in 1998), while its share in public utilities declined from 50 per-
cent in 1929 to 2.4 in 1992). This was due to various types of incentives given
to foreign investors, as policymakers felt that rapid ISI was possible only with
a substantial contribution of foreign finance and technical know-how. The
decline of FDI in public utilities was due to both government regulations
that made investments in that sector unattractive and the fear of nationalist
reactions to the foreign control of strategic sectors.
Reliance on FDI in promoting ISI was due to the government’s prag-
matism. The availability of domestic entrepreneurs with the financial and
technical capacity to create new production facilities was limited, and the
perception was that leaving things to domestic “trial and error” would waste
resources and require too much time.
Within the manufacturing sector foreign investment was especially strong
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in chemicals, transport equipment, food and beverages, and machinery.
In the initial phase of ISI the dominant source of FDI was the U.S.,
which accounted for 44 percent in 1951, followed by Canada (30 percent)
and the U.K. (12.1 percent). Since that time there has been a substantial
diversification of sources. In 2005 the U.S. accounted for only 21.6 percent of
FDI, Canada 6.7 percent, the U.K. for 1.5 percent, while Japan had grown
from almost nothing to 15.5 percent.
3.3.2 India
The arguments favoring state-led industrialization were fuelled by the belief
that the Indian economy should be treated as if it were an “infant econ-
omy” (Patnaik 1979). Rather than depending on the international economy,
domestic consumer demand and heavy public investment were to provide
the necessary stimulus for industrialization. Even in cases where foreign in-
vestment were necessary, it was the states duty to protect the interests of
domestic entrepreneurs.
The initial policy stance of the Indian government was to be wary of for-
eign investments. The industrial policy statements of 1948 and other legal
measures like The Capital Issues Control Act were aimed at restricting for-
eign investment. Despite the restrictions on foreign investments, FDI stock
increased from USD 114 million to USD 185 million, between 1964 and 1974
(Kumar 1995). In the 1970’s, increased regulation on foreign capital resulted
in a stagnation of FDI inflows4. The stock of FDI increased from USD 185
4For example, in 1973, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) was promulgated
with a view to reduce the role of foreign capital in the domestic market. FERA put a
ceiling of 40% on foreign equity participation.
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million in 1974 to USD 189 million in 1980. The share of total FDI in manu-
facturing increased from 20 percent in 1948 to 86.9 percent in 1980 (Kumar
1995). The data shows that British FDI declined from over 75 percent of all
foreign investments in the 1960’s to around 50 percent by 1987, while shares
of Germany, Japan and US steadily increased.
India’s ISI policy was riddled with contradictions. The assumption that
domestic consumer demand and heavy public investment could support in-
dustrial growth was clearly misplaced. In reality, a skewed income distribu-
tion and negligence of agricultural development in the early planning pro-
cess meant that domestic consumption could never play an important role.
Moreover, the resources for massive public investment were raised by deficit
financing and indirect taxation (Patnaik 1979). As a result, public invest-
ment was inflationary and unsustainable in the long-run. Thus, by the late
1970’s, the planning process was already showing signs of breaking down. The
1980’s witnessed a worsening trade balance owing to growing oil imports and
a slow-down of exports. By 199091 the Indian government took the decision
to liberalize its economy and undertake structural adjustment programs. An
important part of this liberalization process was a much greater emphasis on
attracting FDI.
3.4 FDI in the Neo-Liberal Era
3.4.1 Brazil
After the debt-crisis of the 1980s, Brazil was persuaded to adopt neo-liberal
policies. These consisted of drastic reductions in protective tariffs, privatiza-
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tion of state enterprises and the opening of many sectors for private foreign
investments. These policies resulted in a notable re-appearance of FDI in
public utilities and in the exploitation of natural resources. Foreign firms
were allowed to participate in auctions for concession contracts in various
fields of public utilities. Thus, public utilities which had accounted for 50
percent of the stock of FDI in 1929 and had dropped to 2.4 percent in 1992,
rose to 25 percent in 2000 and then declined again to about 10 percent in
2010.
3.4.2 India
The 1990’s marked a major shift in India’s FDI policy. After having followed
a restrictive policy towards foreign investment for four decades, India under-
took major reforms in its economic policy. The new industrial policy of 1991
abolished industrial licensing requirements and eased restrictions on foreign
equity participation.
As a result of these policies, FDI inflows increased steadily during the
1990’s and reached US$ 3.6 billion in 1997. After a brief stagnation following
the Asian crisis, FDI inflows picked up steam from 2003 onwards. During this
period the share of manufacturing in total FDI stock declined from 85 percent
in 1990 to 48 percent in 1997 (Kumar 1995, 2005). This trend continued even
during the 20002010 period, with the share of manufacturing in total FDI
inflows declining from 41 percent in 2005 to 20 percent in 2008 (Rao and Dhar
2011). At the same time infrastructure and services (banking and financial
services, software and telecommunications) have increasingly attracted FDI
inflows (Nagaraj 2003, Kumar 2005).
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3.5 FDI: A Comparative Analysis
Both Brazil and India adopted an industrial development strategy based
on import substitution. However, the policies towards foreign investment
and FDI in particular have been very different. In the following section we
compare and evaluate the impact of the two approaches.
3.5.1 Political Economy of ISI in Brazil and India
A comparative political economy of FDI policies of Brazil and India has not
been adequately analyzed in economic literature. In order to study the two
countries one has to highlight the role of political and social institutions in
molding public policy. To do this, we return to the historical experiences of
the two countries before World War II.
Brazil gained its independence in 1822. Britain acted as a guarantor
of its independence in return for which it obtained privileged access to its
markets and was influential in shaping various types of policies. Many ob-
servers have therefore referred to this period as a “semi-colonial” one. At
that time the main source of wealth was export earnings from primary pro-
duction (mainly coffee). As a result, both the agrarian elites and the urban
elites preferred an open economy with limited state intervention. Even the
industrial growth which began by the late 19th century was influenced by
international factors: the incomes generated via coffee exports provided nec-
essary resources to support early industrial growth (Kohli 2004, Baer 2008,
p. 29). At the same time, immigrant labor brought with it entrepreneurial
and organizational skills that were crucial for the establishment of industrial
enterprises ( Kohli 2004, Baer 2008, ch. 2 and 3). By the 1930’s, the weak-
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ening of the international economy and rising nationalist sentiments drove
the Brazilian leadership to adopt defensive policies which were of an early
import-substituting nature. Although Brazil gradually restricted activities of
foreign investors in some of the sectors where they made an early appearance
(mainly public utilities), it never treated them with the same suspicion as
did India and the ISI policies left considerable room for foreign investment
in new sectors, especially manufacturing.
In the case of India, the British colonial experience lasted for over two
centuries. By the late 19th century, a major anti-colonial struggle had be-
gun. Repatriation of profits, guaranteed returns to investments in railways,
discriminatory tariffs against Indian textiles and the inadequate development
of infrastructure had convinced Indian nationalists about the dangers of in-
tegrating a “infant economy” in the world trading system. The rise of a
“national industrial bourgeoisie” during the 20th century, which bitterly op-
posed colonialism, strengthened nationalist sentiment in India. The aversion
to foreign rule translated into an aversion for foreign investment (Naoroji
1901).
Thus for large sections of the society, independence meant freedom from
foreign domination, not just in the political and social arenas but even in
the economic sphere. The post-colonial state that emerged in 1947 was a
product of this anti-colonial sentiment.
The difference in perceptions of various groups in both countries regard-
ing foreign capital should not come as a surprise. Britain did extract special
trading privileges from Brazil. However, as it was an independent state, it
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enjoyed certain albeit limited flexibility regarding economic policies (Topik
1979, Kohli 2004). The state protected coffee plantations through a price sup-
port scheme known as valorization and was instrumental in setting up banks
and schools (Kohli 2004). Even in the construction of railways, while the
Brazilian state might have provided concessions to private investors, it was
still able to exercise considerable control over its development (Topik 1979).
Moreover, once these concessions started to become burdensome, Brazil’s
government borrowed funds from foreign countries to nationalize most of the
railroad system.
In the case of India, a classic colony by all definitions, the use of monopoly
power by Britain was much more explicit. Britain restricted access by Indi-
ans to finance, land and labor by legal and extra-economic methods. In the
case of the Indian railways, Indian entrepreneurs were not allowed to invest
in them (Bagchi 2002). Further, despite public outrage, guaranteed returns
were not abolished. Thus, in India foreign domination left little room for
domestic classes to bargain with British interests, which, in turn, generated
animosity towards foreign presence in the economy. In Brazil, in contrast, a
sovereign state protected domestic interests (at least for the domestic elites)
creating a conducive and accommodating atmosphere for foreign capital.
It is thus evident that historically, the evolution of political and social
institutions followed different paths in the two countries. These differences
translated into two distinct FDI policies. By the 1980’s both nations were
confronted by severe macro-economic imbalances. In Brazil there was a grow-
ing sentiment against the state both within the middle class and the business
elites (Amann and Baer 2002). Similar changes were taking place in India.
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Big business houses, which were once opposed to foreign investments, had by
now matured and strengthened their positions in the economy (Kohli 1989).
A sum of all these changes resulted in the adoption of neo-liberal policies
starting in the 1990’s.
3.5.2 FDI: Trends and Patterns
Data indicates that Brazil has been much more successful than India in at-
tracting FDI between 1970 and 2010. While the differences between FDI
inflows to the two countries have declined in the neo-liberal era, India con-
tinues to lag behind Brazil in terms of FDI inflows. As a percentage of GDP,
FDI inflows to Brazil stood at 3.3 percent in 2002 and 2.3 percent in 2010. In
case of India FDI inflows were 1.1 percent of the GDP in 2002 and reached
1.5 percent by 2010.
In the case of Brazil, the US had been the largest contributor to FDI
throughout most of the 20th century. In 1951 the share of the United States
in Brazil’s FDI stock was 43.9 percent, gradually declining to 24 percent in
2000 and to 17 percent in 2005. By the latter year the share of many other
countries became significant, including Germany, Japan, the U.K., France
and Spain. In the case of India, Europe, especially Britain has always been
a major source of FDI. However, in the neo-liberal era, FDI sources have
diversified. USA and Singapore have become important sources of FDI. Tax
havens like Mauritius, which accounted for 50 percent of FDI inflows in
20052009, have become substantial sources of FDI (Rao and Dhar 2011).
A striking feature of the neo-liberal era is the phenomenal increase in FDI
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outflows from both India and Brazil (Amann and Baer 2010). FDI outflows
from Brazil increased from USD 0.7 billion in 1994 to USD 11.5 billion in
2010. For India the figures were USD 82 million in 1994 and USD 14.6 billion
in 2010.
What explains these tremendous differences in FDI inflows in the neo-
liberal era? Economic and location factors such as market size and literacy
rates are crucial determinants of FDI (Wheeler and Mody 1992, Zhang 2000,
Chakrabarti 2001). With a bigger GDP and a more developed industrial
base, Brazil was bound to be a more attractive destination for investors5.
Apart from purely economic factors, the institutional framework of a
nation is also an important determinant of FDI flows. This seems to be true
for Brazil and India where the institutions and perceptions developed during
the ISI era have persisted even in the neo-liberal period. Indian policy making
is still marked by export pessimism and gradualism that characterized its ISI
strategy (Ahluwalia 2002, Balasubramanyam and Mahambare 2003). Unlike
Brazil, India never undertook massive privatization programs. Its tariff rates
remained higher than Brazilian ones until the first decade of the 21st century.
Taxes on international trade (import duties, export duties, exchange profits,
etc.) in Brazil accounted for 4 percent of total revenue in 2000 and 2 percent
in 2009. For India, the figures were 19 percent in 2000 and 11 percent in
2009 (World Development Indicators). According to UNCTAD’s inward FDI
potential index covering 141 countries, for the period 2000-2002, Brazil was
ranked 68 while India was placed at 89. The greater extent of liberalization
5In 1991 Brazil’s and India’s GDP was approximately USD 768 billion and 356 bil-
lion respectively. And by 2010 the GDP had reached USD 2.1 trillion and 1.7 trillion
respectively for Brazil and India.
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has been an important factor attracting more foreign investment into Brazil
than into India.
3.5.3 Quality of FDI inflows
One of the important functions of FDI is to serve as a tool of financing de-
velopment. However, FDI cannot be treated as a homogenous concept. The
extent to which FDI flows contribute to development depends largely on its
quality. By quality, some economists (Kumar 2002, 2005) refer to the posi-
tive impact of FDI on productivity, employment and output. Two important
measures of quality are the mode of entry (Greenfield or M&A) and the sec-
toral composition of foreign investments6.
Greenfield FDI adds to real resources of an economy by augmenting do-
mestic capital formation and is associated with strong productivity spillovers.
FDI flows in the form of M & A’s, however, have a smaller impact on pro-
ductive capacity of an economy since they usually involve only a change in
ownership (Mencinger, 2003).
Sectoral composition of FDI is an equally important indicator of FDI
quality. It is generally accepted that FDI directed towards sectors with ex-
tensive backward linkages is more likely to produce sustained growth. The
growth and employment generating potential of FDI in the primary sector
tends to be limited due to lack of linkages with the local economy. On the
other hand, FDI in the manufacturing sector tends to create extensive posi-
tive externalities for the local economy. The impact of service sector FDI, on
6UNCTAD (2000) defines M&A as “acquiring or merging with an existing local firm”
and Greenfield investments refer to the setting up of new firms. See UNCTAD (2000) for
a description of M&A related FDI
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total aggregate GDP growth rates is ambiguous (Alfaro 2003, Chakraborty
and Nunnenkamp 2008).
Table 2.1 shows the ratio of M & A sales to total FDI inflows in Brazil
and India7. The figures indicate a predominance of M & As in FDI. In 2000,
M& A related sales were more than 50 percent of FDI flows to Brazil and
were 30 percent of FDI flows to India. It should be noted, however, that
one quarter of all FDI inflows into Brazil during 1996-2000 were related to
privatizations, which were concentrated in that period.
In terms of sectoral composition there have been major structural shifts
for both India and Brazil. During the early 20th century, FDI was mainly
in the extractive and natural resource sectors and in public utilities. In the
ISI period, both India and Brazil were able to direct foreign investment into
manufacturing, especially into technology intensive sectors. The neo-liberal
era has seen a re-emergence of FDI flows in services and public utilities8.
The share of FDI stock in the manufacturing sector has declined steeply.
3.5.4 FDI Performance: Productivity and Industrial Growth
The relationship between productivity, growth and FDI is an ambiguous one.
While there are numerous instances of countries that have successfully used
FDI to develop their industrial base (United States and Australia during the
late 19th century), the history of Korea, which minimized reliance on foreign
investments, should convince us that FDI is a necessary but not a sufficient
7These ratios are not an accurate reflection of the quality of FDI since M&As need not
always result in FDI inflows.
8This is in complete contrast with the East-Asian experience, where bulk of the FDI
was directed towards export oriented manufacturing sectors.
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condition for successful industrialization (Mardon 1990).
In the ISI period industrial growth of Brazil outpaced that of India. Even
in terms of GDP, Brazil grew at a much faster pace (see Table 2.2 and 2.3).
The extent to which differences in the FDI policies explain the divergence in
economic performance in the two countries is difficult to quantify. In certain
sectors, however, FDI seems to have played a major role.
The case of the automobile sector is one such example where FDI did
have an important role9. The Indian government, unlike that of Brazil,
severely restricted FDI and kept strict control over technology transfer. By
1980, Brazilian car production was 20 times that of India’s (Humphrey etal.
1998). The Brazilian strategy had another added advantage. Specifically,
competition from MNCs and transfer of technology helped develop an effi-
cient automobile component producing sector. In India, these spillover effects
were limited because of restrictions imposed on foreign investments, result-
ing in less efficient component manufacturers (Humphrey etal. 1998). Even
in the electronics goods industry, Brazilian pragmatism benefited industrial
growth10.
After the economic reforms of the 1990’s, GDP growth rates in Brazil and
India have been increasing steadily (especially after 2003).The service sector
has been the biggest contributor to GDP. Until 2003, industrial growth was
9It might be argued that the automobile industry did not have a large enough internal
market in India and thus would not have had a substantial impact on the economy anyway.
The possibility of exploiting external markets however, weakens this argument.
10While both India and Brazil restricted MNC’s in this sector, the Brazilian approach
was marked by pragmatism and caution. India, on the other hand, was much harsher on
MNC’s so much so that in 1976 IBM was forced to withdraw from its Indian operations.
See Sridharan (1996)
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disappointing. In Brazil manufacturing value added grew at an average of
1.5 percent during 1990-2003 and 3 percent from 2003-2010. In India manu-
facturing value added grew at 5.7 percent in the 1990-2003 (which was slower
than the 1981-1990 growth rates)11 and at 9 percent during 2003-2010. Table
2.2 and 2.3 show the trends.
What explains the slow growth of the industrial sector in 1990-2003? To
a large extent, industrial performance can be explained by the changes in
the institutional structure of these economies. Historically, industrial growth
was financed by public investment in India and a combination of public and
foreign investment in the case of Brazil. In a liberalized economy, however,
public spending is constrained: an increase in fiscal deficits leads to inflation
which, in turn, causes depreciation of the currency. Faced with the prospect
of weakening currencies, foreign investors are less likely to invest. The case of
Brazil and India has been no different as public investment declined during
this period (Mohan 2008, Afonso, Arajo and Jnior 2005).
In such a scenario, foreign investment becomes crucial to finance indus-
trial growth. In reality, not only has the share of FDI in manufacturing
declined (in addition to the growing proportion of M&As in total FDI), even
the volume of inflows have been relatively small. For instance, in 1995 FDI
inflows to Brazil and India were 1.2 percent and 0.6 percent of world FDI
inflows compared to China’s 11 percent. By 2005 the shares were 1.5 percent,
7.3 percent and 0.8 percent for Brazil, China and India respectively. These
trends, coupled with declining public investments are a big factor behind the
11Manufacturing value added grew at an average rate of 6.2% in that period.
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lackluster performance of industries during the first decade of reforms12. It
is no surprise therefore that increases in manufacturing growth rates after
2003 have coincided with increases in public investments in India. Even in
Brazil aggressive government spending in crucial sectors like infrastructure
have played an important role in stimulating industries. Public investment
in infrastructure was the main thrust of the PAC (“growth acceleration pro-
gram”) program in Brazil (OECD 2011, p. 27).
Industrial productivity in both economies has improved in the last two
decades (Bonelli 2002, Ferreira and Rossi 2003, Unel 2003). MNC’s have
played an important role in this regard. There are two channels through
which, in theory, FDI could contribute towards industrial productivity. First,
in the presence of MNC’s, local firms could be forced to invest in R&D in
order to remain competitive. As a result, firms might take part in innovative
activities. FDI could thus provide a stimulus to the economy to modernize
many of its leading sectors (Amann and Baer 2010, Kumar 2005). Second,
MNC’s might play an important role in R&D in both countries. For example,
TNC’s like Motorola, General Motors in Brazil and Novartis GlaxoSmithK-
line and Microsoft in India, have set up R&D facilities. In fact, in Brazil,
of the total patents granted to residents by the USPTO, 42 percent were
on account of foreign affiliates in 2001-2003. In the same period in India,
40 percent of patents granted by the USPTO were associated with foreign
affiliates (UNCTAD 2005, p. 135).
12Doytch and Uctum (2011) find evidence suggesting that a decline in the share of
manufacturing in total FDI (especially if this decline entails a shift towards non-financial
services) could be detrimental to the manufacturing sector, and could even result in de-
industrialization.
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Despite the increasing importance of foreign investments in the economy,
the levels of R&D have been modest. R&D as a percentage of GDP amounted
to 1.1 percent of GDP in Brazil and 0.8 percent in India, compared to 2.7
percent in the U.S. The impact of the modest amount of R&D in both country
means that dependence on foreign technology by them will continue to be
substantial. This can be measured by examining the patent applications of
Brazil and India, compared to industrial countries. It will be noted that
whereas in 2007 patent applications of China amounted to 153,060 and of
the U.S. 241,347, the total amount for Brazil in that year was 4,023 and for
India 6,296.
3.6 Conclusion
Our comparative analysis of FDI in Brazil and India shows the importance
of historical and institutional awareness in gaining an understanding of the
manner in which each society perceived the role of foreign investments in
their societies. By doing this, we gained an understanding of the reasons
these countries adopted different attitudes and policies towards foreign cap-
ital.
We have shown how historical experiences of both countries shaped both,
formal (laws and regulations) and informal institutions (perceptions regard-
ing foreign investment) in the post-independence era. During the ISI era,
FDI came to play an important role in the industrial development of Brazil.
In the case of India the colonial experiences, in addition to political and so-
cial restrictions, prevented it from fully exploiting the advantages of FDI.
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In the neo-liberal era, though both countries have opened their doors to
foreign investments, the institutions established during the ISI era have per-
sisted. In comparison with Brazil, the Indian liberalization policy continues
to be marked by export pessimism and gradualism. As a result, Brazil has
been far more successful at attracting FDI than has India: in 2010 FDI stocks
in Brazil were more than twice the FDI stocks in India.
Though FDI is an important ingredient of development, the extent to
which FDI contributes to economic development depends not only on the
quantity of inflows but also on its structural composition and its spillover
effects on the domestic economy, or what has been come to be known as FDI
quality. By analyzing two key determinants of FDI quality- the sector wise
distribution of FDI and its mode of entry- we find that the structure of FDI
has undergone tremendous changes in the neo-liberal era. First, there has
been a shift of FDI away from manufacturing sector towards public utilities
and services. Second, M&A related FDI inflows have become predominant
in Brazil and to a lesser extent in India.
FDI may have contributed in part to the high industrial growth rates of
India and of Brazil’s recovery from its slow growth rates in the last decades
of the 20th century. Yet as we have noted, that a strong presence of the state
can also influence the effectiveness of foreign investments by increasing public
spending in infrastructure and other key sectors of the economy. From a pol-
icy perspective our analysis makes it clear that an effective FDI policy is one
in which state intervention and foreign investments complement each other,
thereby maximizing the potential for industrial growth and development.
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3.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Cross-Border M&A Sales for Selected Years (Millions of dollars)
1990 1996 2000 2005 2010
Brazil
- 32 2987 17274 2993 8874
(n) (27.67 %) (52.69 %) (19.86 %) (18.32 %)
India
5 141 1064 526 5537
(2.10%) (5.50%) (29.65%) (6.90%) (22.47%)
Source: World Investment Report(UNCTAD), Various Years
Table 2.2: Macroeconomic Indicators of Brazil
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
GDP (% annual growth) 1.6 2.6 3.6
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 20.8 17.9 6.9
Industrial value added (% of GDP) 44.6 31.5 27.7
Manufacturing value added (% of GDP) 32.6 20.0 17.0
Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports) 45.8 55.4 48.5
Services value added (% of GDP) 45.8 61.8 66.1
Source: World Development Indicators
Table 2.3: Macroeconomic Indicators of India
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
GDP (% annual growth) 5.6 5.5 7.8
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 20.6 22.7 28.8
Industrial value added (% of GDP) 26.2 26.4 27.3
Manufacturing value added (% of GDP) 16.6 16.2 15.3
Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports) 61.3 74.9 69.55
Services value added (% of GDP) 42.50 46.6 53.3
Source: World Development Indicators
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Here we provide the proof for proposition 3. The human capital dynamics in
a private education regime is given by (drop the superscripts for convenience):
hit+1 = A(hit) =

A2(hit) = ∆
2(hit)
1−β if hit ≥ h˜
A1(hit) = ∆˜
2(hit)
1−β if hit < h˜
(A.1)
In a public regime, the dynamics are:
hit+1 = B(hit) =

B2(hit) = ∆
1h¯t
α
(hit)
1−α−β if hit ≥ h˜
B1(hit) = ∆˜
1h¯t
α
(hit)
1−α−β if hit < h˜
(A.2)
Where ∆1 = (τwt)
α(β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1− τ + γ)
(bψ¯ + β(1− σ))
)β
∆˜1 = (τwt)
α(β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1− τ + γ)
(bψ(hit) + β(1− σ))
)β
∆2 = (wtα)
α(β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1 + γ)
bψ¯ + (α + β)(1− σ)
)α+β
∆˜2 = (wtα)
α(β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1 + γ)
bψ(hit) + (α + β)(1− σ)
)α+β
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Consider the private education dynamics. We shall proceed in three steps:
• Following assumption A1, ψ(0) = ψ0 > 0 which implies h∗ = 0 is
clearly a solution to the dynamical system.
• When hit < h˜ the relevant dynamics are given by A1(hit). To analyse
the dynamics of this function, define two continuous functions:
f1(hit) = hit
β and f2(hit) = (wtα)
α(β
γ
)β
(
(1−σ)(1+γ)
bψ(hit)+(α+β)(1−σ)
)α+β
.
The dynamical system can be written as f1 = f2. Note that, f1(0) = 0,
limh→+∞ f1(hit) =∞ and f1(hit)′ = βhitβ−1 > 0 for hit > 0. Similarly,
f2(0) > 0 and under (A1), f2(hit)
′ < 0. This shows that both functions
can intersect at one point hP > 0. Thus A1(hit) can have only one
non-trivial fixed point, hP .
• When hit ≥ h˜ the relevant dynamics are given by a concave function
A2(hit). It is easy to see that there is only one possible non-trivial fixed
point:
hR =
(
(wtα)
α(
β
γ
)β
(
(1− σ)(1 + γ)
bψ¯ + (α + β)(1− σ)
)α+β) 1β
(A.3)
If A1(h˜) ≤ h˜ and A2(h˜) ≤ h˜ then 0 and hP are the only equilibrium
(Figure 1.3). If A1(h˜) ≤ h˜ and A2(h˜) ≥ h˜ then there are multiple equi-
libria 0, hP and hR (Figure 1.1). Finally if A1(h˜) ≥ h˜ then 0 and hR
are the only equilibrium (Figure 1.2).
Similarly for the public education regime, in an identical manner we can
show that proposition 3 holds. It is easy to see that for both B1(hit)
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and B2(hit), 0 is a fixed point. Moreover by the same reasoning as
above we can argue that B1(hit) and B2(hit) have unique non-trivial
steady states. SO we can conclude: If B1(h˜) ≤ h˜ and B2(h˜) ≤ h˜ then 0
and hP are the only equilibrium (Figure 1.3). If B1(h˜) ≤ h˜ and B2(h˜) ≥
h˜ then there are multiple equilibria 0, hP and hR (Figure 1.1). Finally
if B1(h˜) ≥ h˜ then 0 and hR are the only equilibrium (Figure 1.2).
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